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1. 1 Object and limitations of the thesis 
In April 2010 Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg and Russian president Dmitri 
Medvedev surprisingly announced a Treaty concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation 
in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean which was signed on 15 September 2010 in 
Murmansk
1
 (hereafter: Barents Sea Treaty). This Treaty ended almost forty years of 
negotiations between Norway and Russia and has been commonly described as historical. 
According to the joint statement it is recommended to establish "a line that divided the overall 
disputed area in two parts of approximately the same size".
2
 Such delimitation line is defined 
by only eight coordinates in Article 1 of the Barents Sea Treaty. However, this Treaty is 
comprehensive. Apart from the establishment of the delimitation line, the Barents Sea Treaty 
contains provisions concerning fisheries matters.
3
 
Living marine resources in the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean have a huge economic 
significance for Norway and Russia which have traditionally been involved in fisheries of 
various species. The Preamble of the Barents Sea Treaty underlines their primary interest and 
responsibility for the conservation and management of the living marine resources in these 
Areas. 
In this thesis, the implications of the Barents Sea Treaty for fisheries management will be 
assessed. The main research question will be whether the provisions of the Barents Sea Treaty 
affect the cooperation and conservation obligations of the coastal states, Norway and Russia. 
The Barents Sea Treaty has a wider geographical and subject-matter scope. This Treaty 
includes provisions on how to deal with the shared resources in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean
4
. Hence, the two limitations are established in the current research. As it was said 
above, the focus will be made on the marine living resources, namely the fish stocks. 
                                                          
1
 Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Oslo, April 
27th, 2010. Available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/campaigns/delimitation/treaty_background.html?id=614274 [Visited 
March 25th, 2013] and Annex 1; Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, OS - 15 
September 2010, EIF - 07 July 2011. Available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf [Visited March 25th, 2013] and 
Annex 2. 
2
 Joint Statement, supra note 1, paragraph 4. 
3
 Barents Sea Treaty, supra note1, Article 4 and Annex I. 
4
 Ibid., Articles 4 and 5, Annexes I and II. 




Moreover, the application of the Barents Sea Treaty for fisheries matters will be related to the 
Barents Sea, including the FPZ around Svalbard. 
 
1. 2 Legal sources and method 
In order to examine the research question thoroughly, various sources of international law 
mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
5
 will be used. 
There are international conventions and agreements in force between Norway and Russia, 
international custom and general principles of law. Judicial decisions and the publications of 
the most highly qualified authors are recognized as subsidiary sources. 
The Barents Sea Treaty between the coastal states occupies a central place among legal 
sources which will be analyzed. This bilateral Treaty is aimed at the management of living 
marine resources within the 200 nautical miles zones of Norway and Russia. 
Taking biological characteristics of fish stocks as the point of departure, the primary focus is 
given to the international legal regime for fisheries. The centerpiece here is the fisheries 
provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
6
 (hereafter: LOSC) to which 
both coastal states are parties. The LOSC contains primary rules related to the EEZ and the 
high seas that involve fish stocks. Furthermore, the fisheries regime of the LOSC is expanded 
with the 1992 UN Convention on biological diversity
7
 (hereafter: CBD) and the 1995 UN 
Agreement relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks
8
 (hereafter: FSA). They will be considered for identification of the 
obligations of the coastal state regarding to the management of fish stocks in the Barents Sea. 
While the LOSC provides a general obligation to cooperate, the FSA goes relatively far in 
determining specific duties for how the cooperation should be. 
The FSA is an implementing agreement under the LOSC. It flows from its title. Consequently, 
the relevant provisions of the LOSC concerning management of fish stocks are to be read and 
                                                          
5
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, OS - 26 June 1945, EIF - 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS xvi. 
6
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, OS - 10 December 1982, EIF - 16 November 
1994, 1833 UNTS 397, Basic Documents No. 36. Norway signed on 10 December 1982, ratified on 24 June 
1996. Russia signed on 10 December 1982, ratified on 12 March 1997. 
7
 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, OS - 5 June 1992, EIF - 29 December 1993, 1760 UNTS 
79. Norway signed on 9 June 1992, ratified on 9 July 1993. Russia signed on 13 June 1992, ratified on 5 April 
1995. 
8
 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, OS - 4 August 1995, EIF - 11 December 2001. 2167 UNTS 88, 
Basic Documents No. 56. Norway signed on 4 December 1995, ratified on 30 December 1996. Russia signed on 
4 December 1995, ratified on 4 August 1997. 




applied in conjunction with the FSA.
9
 The FSA gives particular emphasis to regional 
cooperation in the management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, namely on the high seas. However, some provisions of the 
FSA are applicable to areas under national jurisdiction
10
, in the EEZs or exclusive fisheries 
zones. Norway and Russia are parties of the FSA. Nevertheless, a state can be a party to the 
FSA without being party to the LOSC. The FSA includes obligations both for coastal states 
and for states fishing on the high seas. 
The international legal regime for fisheries is supplemented with the CBD. Aside from the 
cooperation obligation, this Convention develops the obligation of the coastal states to 
conserve biological diversity. The CBD acknowledges the unity of any marine ecosystem
11
 
including different elements of biological diversity
12
 such as fish stocks. Hence, the 
provisions of the CBD apply to fish stocks of the Barents Sea within the areas under national 
jurisdiction and the area beyond the limits of such jurisdiction.
13
 The CBD contains binding 
commitments for Norway and Russia. They as parties of this Convention are required to 
comply with them. 
Along with the main legal sources pointed out above, the 1975 and 1976 Agreements
14
 and 
the fisheries agreements of Norway and Russia with other states will be analyzed. They form 
the basis for the Barents Sea fisheries regime.  
Provisions of the 1920 multilateral Treaty concerning Spitsbergen
15
 (hereafter: Spitsbergen 
Treaty) will be used to answer whether the Barents Sea Treaty can be read as Russian 
acknowledgement of the right of Norway to establish normal maritime zones around 
                                                          
9
 FSA, supra note 8, Article 4. 
10
 Ibid., Articles 2 and 3. 
11
 According to Article 2 of the CBD, supra note 7, an ecosystem is "a dynamic complex of plant, animal and 
micro-organism communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit". 
12
 According to Article 2 of the CBD, supra note 7, biological diversity is "the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems". 
13
 Ibid., Article 4. 
14
 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on cooperation in the fishing industry, Moscow, OS and EIF - 11 April 1975, 983 UNTS 8; 
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics concerning mutual relations in the field of fisheries, Moscow, OS - 15 October 1976, EIF - 
21 April 1977, 1157 UNTS 147. 
15
 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, Paris, OS - 9 February 1920, EIF - 14 August 1925 
(Norway) and 07 May 1935 (USSR), 2 LNTS 7. 




Svalbard. Furthermore, other pertinent international and national
16
 legal instruments will also 
be taken into account. 
The mentioned legal sources have been treated throughout the thesis using both a descriptive 
and analytical method. 
 
1. 3 Structure 
This thesis divided into four main chapters. 
The second chapter opens with a brief description of the Barents Sea marine ecosystem and its 
living marine resources. Since the Master thesis is emphasized on the obligations of Norway 
and Russia regarding fish stocks, it is important to outline their maritime boundaries in the 
Barents Sea. Status of these zones imposes certain obligations on Norway and Russia as the 
coastal states. 
Before answering the main research question, obligations of Norway and Russia have to be 
defined. Hence, the third chapter examines which obligations concerning the management of 
transboundary fish stocks in the Barents Sea are imposed on Norway and Russia as coastal 
states. The assessment of how Norway and Russia have fulfilled their obligations will be 
given. 
The obligation to cooperate forms a frame for the fulfillment of other obligations. Some 
questions about the cooperation between Norway and Russia through the JFC will be raised. 
One of them is related to how the JFC should be considered according to the FSA; whether 
the JFC is an example of a direct cooperation or a cooperation through a RFMO or an 
arrangement. Another question is referred to whether the JFC is entitled to regulate the fishing 
on the high seas and to what extent. 
The fourth chapter deals with consequences of the Barents Sea Treaty for the management of 
fish stocks in the Barents Sea. In addition to the reflection of how this Treaty affects the 
defined obligations, the chapter brings up the questions of whether the Barents Sea Treaty can 
be read as the recognition of Russia that the establishment of maritime zones around Svalbard 
                                                          
16
 Internal law of the coastal states will be considered in the original language. Besides English, the author of the 
thesis has a good command of Norwegian and Russian language. Translation can be found on 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/NOR.htm (for Norwegian 
legislation) and http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/RUS.htm (for 
Russian legislation) [Visited August 26th, 2013]. 




is not prevented by the Spitsbergen Treaty; and whether the Barents Sea Treaty takes into 
account the effects of climate change in the Barents Sea. 






































2 Fisheries regime of the Barents Sea 
 
2. 1 The main features of the Barents Sea 
The Barents Sea is a high latitude shelf sea in the northeast Atlantic.
17
 It comprises those parts 
of the Arctic Ocean lying between North Cape on the Norwegian mainland, South Cape on 
the Spitsbergen Island of the Svalbard Archipelago, and the Russian archipelagos Novaya 
Zemlya and Franz Josef's Zemlya.
18
 
The natural resources of the Barents Sea, living or non-living marine resources, are the source 
of interest for different actors. There is the interest in exploring, exploiting, protection and 
managing natural resources, security interest etc. It was pointed out before that attention in the 
thesis is given to fish stocks of the Barents Sea. 
The Barents Sea is one of the large marine ecosystems.
19
 Its living components include not 
only numerous fish stocks, but marine mammals such as whales, walrus and seals. Moreover, 
the Barents Sea floor is inhabited by a wide range of organisms.
20
 
The Barents Sea is highly productive oceans in the world. The rich in situ plankton production 
and advection from the Norwegian Sea sustain a great abundance of fish resources.
21
 Cod, 
haddock, capelin, herring, saithe, redfish and other commercially important fish species occur 
in the Barents Sea.
22
 It should be stressed that by no means all of these fish stocks are 
confined to the Barents Sea during their life cycle. 
Various types of fish stocks have different migratory ranges. While some of the fish stocks, 
such as redfish, saithe and herring, are found within either the Norwegian or the Russian 
EEZs, other species migrate out of these boundaries.
23
 Such geographical distribution which 
does not correspond to the jurisdictional boundaries of states or fisheries management 
organizations poses different problems with respect to the authority of coastal states, flag 
states and mentioned organizations. 
                                                          
17
 Atlas of the Barents Sea fishes. Edited by Rupert Wienerroither ... [et al.]. Bergen, (Institute of Marine 
Research) 2011, p. 7. 
18
 Geir Hønneland, "Compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries. How fishermen account for conformity with rules", 
Marine Policy, vol. 24, 1 (2000), p. 11. 
19
 Atlas of the Barents Sea fishes, supra note 17, p. 7. 
20
 ICES. Report of the Arctic Fisheries Working Group (AFWG), 20 - 26 April 2012 (ICES Headquarters, 
Copenhagen), pp. 19-20. Available at 
http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Expert%20Group%20Report/acom/2012/AFWG/AFWG%
20Report%202012.pdf  [Visited July 12th, 2013]. 
21
 Atlas of the Barents Sea fishes, supra note 17, p. 7. 
22
 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
23
 Report of the AFWG, supra note 20, pp. 20-21. 




2. 2 Legal framework of fisheries jurisdiction in the Barents Sea 
Legally, the ocean space where fish stocks occur is divided into various maritime zones. The 
LOSC as "a Constitution for the Ocean"
24
 lays down the basic provisions on how fish stocks 
should be governed by coastal states concerning this zonal division. 
These maritime zones determine what kind of activities different states can carry out and their 
authority to regulate marine activities within those areas. For the purpose of the thesis, status 
of various maritime zones in the Barents Sea defines obligations of the two coastal states in 
regard to fish stocks. In this respect, current part of the chapter aims to give a brief description 
of the jurisdictional boundaries according to the LOSC and explain how they apply to the 
Barents Sea. 
The primary rule of the current international legal system is state sovereignty which means 
that each coastal state has supreme power to rule over its territory. Furthermore, sovereignty 
includes the powers to determine the breath of the territorial sea and to establish other 
maritime zones measured from baselines.
25
 
The territorial sea, the first maritime zone seawards from the baseline, is under the 
sovereignty of the coastal state. Foreign fishing vessels must refrain from fishing activities in 
the territorial sea.
26
 Norway and Russia established a twelve nautical miles limit for their 
territorial seas according to Article 3 of the LOSC.
27
 Such breadth was set by Norway both for 
its mainland and for Svalbard.
28
 
The next zone beyond the territorial sea which is significant in the Barents Sea is the 
continental shelf. Norway and the USSR under the adoption of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf
29
 claimed sovereign rights to their continental shelves.
30
 Later, the outer 
                                                          
24
 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Successes, Challenges and New Agendas. Edited by David 
Freestone. Leiden, (Martinus Nijhoff) 2013, p. 170. 
25
 It will be discussed in the part 4.1, see footnote 162. 
26
 LOSC, supra note 6, Articles 19 (2) (i) and 42 (1) (c). 
27
 Federal Law from 31 July 1998 No. 155-FZ "On the internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone of the 
Russian Federation" (Федеральный закон "О внутренних морских водах, территориальном море и 
прилежащей зоне Российской Федерации"), Article 3. Available in Russian at http://base.garant.ru/12112602/ 
[Visited July 22th, 2013]; Law from 27 June 2003 No. 57 on Norwegian territorial waters and contiguous zone 
(Lov om Norges territorialfarvann og tilstøtende sone [territorialfarvannsloven]), § 2. Available in Norwegian at 
http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20030627-057.html#1 [Visited July 23rd, 2013]. 
28
 Territorialfarvannsloven, supra note 27, § 2 and 5. 
29
 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, OS - 29 April 1958, EIF - 10 June 1964, 516 UNTS 205. 
30
 Royal Decree relating to the Sovereignty of Norway over the Sea-bed and Subsoil Outside the Norwegian 
Coast, 31 May 1963; English translation in UN Legislative Series B/15, p. 393; Decree of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR concerning the Continental Shelf of the USSR, 6 February 1968; English 
translation in UN Legislative Series B/15, p. 441. This Decree was succeeded by the Federal Law from 30 




limit of the Norwegian continental shelf to the north of Svalbard has been determined in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf.
31
 Russia is still making a submission to this Commission according to Article 76 of the 
LOSC to extend its continental shelf. 
Notwithstanding the relevance of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea, it is out of our 
interest from the fisheries point of view. Regime of the continental shelf is not applied to the 
water column.
32
 Under Article 77 of the LOSC the coastal states exercise sovereign rights 
over sedentary species for the purpose of their exploring and exploiting. These species are not 
covered in the current thesis. 
In 1977 the 200 nautical miles EEZs were established by Norway and the USSR.
33
 According 
to Article 56 (1) of the LOSC the coastal states has "sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing" the fish stocks within the EEZ. Along 
with prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction in their EEZs, Norway and Russia may exercise 




Another area established in the Barents Sea is a 200-mile nondiscriminatory FPZ around 
Svalbard.
35
 However, fisheries jurisdiction of Norway within the FPZ has been challenged by 
third states. This question will be discussed in the fourth chapter. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
November 1995 No. 187-FZ  "On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation" (Федеральный закон "О 
континентальном шельфе Российской Федерации"). Available in Russian at http://base.garant.ru/10108686/ 
[Visited July 19th, 2013]. 
31
 Continental Shelf: Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the 
Norwegian Sea. Executive Summary. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf  [Visited April 10th, 2013]. 
The recommendations are available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf [Visited April 10th, 2013]. 
32
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 78 (1). 
33
 Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein. Marine Management in Disputed Area: The Case of the Barents Sea. 
London, (Routledge) 1992, p. 21. See more detailed: Law from 17 December 1976 No. 91 on the Norwegian 
Exclusive Economic Zone (Lov om Norges økonomiske sone [økonomiske soneloven]). Available in Norwegian 
at http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-19761217-091-0.html#3 [Visited June 27th, 2013]; Federal Law from 17 
December 1998 No. 191-FZ  "On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation" (Федеральный 
закон "Об исключительной экономической зоне Российской Федерации"). Available in Russian at 
http://base.garant.ru/179872/ [Visited June 27th, 2013]. 
34
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 73 (1). 
35
 Regulations from 03 June 1977 No. 06 on the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard (Forskrift om 
fiskevernsone ved Svalbard). Available in Norwegian at http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-
wift/ldles?doc=%2Fsf%2Fsf%2Fsf-19770603-0006.html [Visited April 9th, 2013]. 




Fisheries in the disputed area of the Barents Sea 
After the mentioned establishments the two coastal states had to deal with the delimitation of 
the EEZs and the continental shelf in the Barents Sea. Without the achievement of a 
consensus on their maritime delimitation dispute, Norway and Russia agreed on a temporary 
arrangement to regulate fishing activities in the disputed area.
36
 
This arrangement, called the Grey Zone Agreement, covered an area within 200 nautical miles 
from the mainland coast of both countries. The "grey zone" comprised 67,500 km
2
, of which 
41,500 km
2
 lied in the disputed area.
37
 Apart from the provisions stating that both countries 
were to refrain from conducting inspections or from exercising any form of control over 
fishing vessels of the other country, the Agreement also contained provisions relating to how 
third-country vessels shall be treated in the area.
38
 The Agreement was valid for one year and 
has been extended every year since it was adopted. It was stated that the provisional 




Since the start of the negotiations Norway and Russia have respected international law as the 
applicable law of the delimitation process.
40
 When the negotiations started, Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf to which both states were parties was the governing law. 
It was stated that the median line was the boundary unless another boundary is justified by 
"special circumstances". Today the governing law is the LOSC, namely Articles 74 and 83. 
Both parties argued that these new provisions upheld their reading of Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf.
41
 
Norway and Russia achieved the consensus on their maritime delimitation dispute by the 
ratification of the Barents Sea Treaty in 2011. The described "grey zone" disappeared and the 
                                                          
36
 Agreement on a Temporary Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents Sea with 
Attached Protocol, Oslo, OS - 11 January 1978, EIF - 27 April 1978, expiry - 6 July 2011. Text of the 
Agreement is found in the master thesis by Lars Eliassen, Gråsoneavtalen  mellom Norge og Russland, 
Universitetet i Tromsø, 2008, Annex. Available in Norwegian at 
http://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/1500/thesis.pdf?sequence=1 [Visited May 15th, 2013]. 
37
 Alex G.Oude Elferink. The Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: A Case Study of the Russian Federation. 
Dordrecht, (Martinus Nijhoff) 1994. (Publications on Ocean Development, vol. 24), p. 9. 
38
 Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, supra note 33, p. 67. 
39
 Ibid., p. 67. 
40
 P. Tresselt, "Norsk-sovjetiske forhandlinger om avgrensning av kontinentalsokler og økonomiske soner", 
Internasjonal Politikk, vol. 46, 2–3 (1988), p. 79. 
41
 The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction. Edited by Alex G. Oude Elferink and 
Donald R. Rothwell. The Hague, (Martinus Nijhoff) 2001. (Publications on Ocean Development, vol. 37), pp. 
186-187. 




waters became a subject to the sovereign rights of the coastal states singly. Since the  
Agreement expired, its subsequent consideration is irrelevant. 
 
As it showed in the Figure of Annex 3 there is an enclave of the high seas in the Barents Sea, 
known as the "Loophole", which is surrounded by the Norwegian and the Russian EEZs. The 
high seas are open to use by all states.
42
 The main principle of the high seas established under 
the LOSC is the freedom of fishing.
43
 
However, the described entitlements of the coastal states in respect to maritime zones are 



















                                                          
42
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 87(1). 
43
 Ibid., Article 87(1) (e). 




3 Obligations of the coastal states concerning management of fish stocks in the Barents 
Sea 
 
3. 1 Content of the obligation to cooperate in the Barents Sea 
Fisheries jurisdiction of the single coastal state was described in the previous chapter. 
However, many fish stocks in the Barents Sea are subjected to the sovereign rights of the two 
coastal states and to the freedom on the high seas. So for instance, cod, haddock and capelin 
are joint species which occur within the Norwegian EEZ as well as the Russian EEZ.
44
 At the 
same time the Northeast Atlantic cod partly migrates outside the EEZs. These species are 
found in the Barents Sea Loophole.
45
 Hence, there is a natural necessity for cooperation 
between relevant states in order to manage indicated fish stocks. Such obligation of a state to 
cooperate is stated in Articles 63, 64 and 118 of the LOSC. 
The obligation to cooperate is defined differently in the LOSC, depending on the categories of 
fish stocks. The stocks which move across the boundary between an EEZ and the high seas 
are called "straddling stocks".
46
 Those which occur within two or more EEZs are referred to 
"shared stocks".
47
 The term "transboundary fish stocks"
48
 is used under the research as a 
common definition for the latter two categories and also includes "highly migratory stocks"
49
. 
These species are listed in Annex I of the LOSC, whereas most of them migrate considerable 
distances during their life cycle, through EEZs of two or more states as well as on the high 
seas (e. g. tuna and swordfish).
50
 
Cooperation between states is important to successfully govern transboundary fish stocks in 
the Barents Sea. However, it is necessary to distinguish between two elements of the 
obligation to cooperate. The format of the cooperation will be discussed after analysis of the 
content of the obligation to cooperate. 
                                                          
44
 Arne Eide ... [et al.], "Challenges and Successes in the Management of a Shared Fish Stock – The Case of the 
Russian–Norwegian Barents Sea Cod Fishery", Acta Borealia: A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies, vol. 
30, 1 (2013), pp. 1-2; Report of the AFWG, supra note 20, p. 21. 
45
 Ibid. and Olav Schram Stokke, "Managing Fisheries in the Barents Sea Loophole: Interplay with the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement", Ocean Development & International Law, vol. 32, 3 (2001), p. 242. 
46
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 63 (2). 
47
 Ibid., Article 63 (1). 
48
 This term has been used in the literature. See, for instance, Ellen Hey. The Regime for the Exploitation of 
Transboundary Marine Resources. Dordrecht, (Martinus Nijhoff) 1989, pp. 1–2; and M. Hayashi, “The 
Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks Under the LOS Convention”, International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 8 (1993), p. 311. 
49
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 64. 
50
 Robin R. Churchill and Alan V. Lowe. The Law of the Sea. 3rd edition. Manchester, (Manchester University 
Press) 1999, p. 289. 




The obligation to cooperate implies the fulfillment of procedural requirements between states. 
Such procedural requirements are related to consultation, notification and negotiation, 
information sharing, the conclusion of environmental impact assessments and other actions.
51
 
Furthermore, this obligation has been interpreted by international courts and arbitration and 
has probably now become part of international customary law.
52
 
Case law states that even if the obligation to cooperate is an obligation of process, the 
fulfillment of the procedural requirements is not sufficient. They need to be fulfilled in good 
faith: "One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are 
inherent in international cooperation, in particular in an age when this cooperation in many 
fields is becoming increasingly essential".
53
 
States are not obligated to conclude any agreement on cooperation. They are "under an 
obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement" and "under an 
obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful".
54
 Thus, the 
obligation to cooperate remains an obligation of process, not of a result: "Where the parties 
are under an obligation to negotiate [...], they are under an obligation ‘not only to enter into 
negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements 
[...]. But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement".
55
 In 
other words, there is generally no obligation to conclude any agreement. Cooperation should 
be pursued as far as possible, but the obligation does not exist definitely. 
Case law makes clear that the duty to cooperate is an essential obligation of international law. 
However, it should be noted that the different cooperation provisions according to their 
wording indicate various scopes of specific duties to cooperate.
56
 Under the thesis, the 
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obligation to cooperation is related to the management of transboundary fish stocks in the 
Barents Sea. 
According to case law discussed above and the wording of Article 63 of the LOSC, Norway 
and Russia as the coastal states have a clear obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith 
and in a meaningful way with a view to reach an agreement as a necessary measure. This 
obligation to cooperate is also related to "associated species"
57
 exploiting of which the coastal 
state is not interested in, but which are essential components of the ecosystem. 
Along with the similarity of provisions in Article 63 of the LOSC, there are some differences. 
The obligation to cooperation concerning the shared fish stocks is extensive. It includes 
necessary measures which aim not only to prevent overfishing, but to maintain them at a high 
level.
58
 For straddling fish stocks, the geographical scope of the obligation to cooperate is 
limited to the areas of the high seas where such fish stocks occur.
59
 Furthermore, states are not 
required to develop straddling fish stocks through the cooperation. As opposed to it, Article 
63 (1) of the LOSC contains a reference to development shared fish stocks and coordination 
of conservation measures which implies the setting of a joint TAC in the EEZs of each state.
60
 
Article 64 of the LOSC provides the obligation to cooperate "with a view to ensuring 
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization" of highly migratory species 
both within and beyond the EEZ. In contrast to Article 63, this duty is not qualified by any 
terms like "seek", "try" or "endeavour". However, the wording "with a view to ensuring 
conservation" weakens the obligation somewhat. 
Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission 
To evaluate how Norway and Russia as the coastal states have fulfilled their cooperation and 
conservation obligations in the Barents Sea, the 1975 and 1976 Agreements should be 
considered. They form the basis for bilateral management regime of the Barents Sea. 
The 1975 Agreement stresses the need for conservation, rational utilization of living marine 
resources and neighborly relations between Norway and Russia.
61
 To reach such goals the 
                                                          
57
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 63 (1) and (2). See also the part 3.3.3 of the thesis. 
58
 William T. Burke, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond. Oxford, (Oxford 
University Press) 1994, pp. 52-55. 
59
 LOSC, supra note 6, Article 63 (2): "... the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area". 
60
 Ellen Hey, supra note 48, p. 56. 
61
 1975 Agreement, supra note 14, Preamble. 




JFC has been established.
62
 The Commission convenes at least once a year
63
 with 
representatives from both countries.
64
 
Provisions of the 1976 Agreement, all of which are procedural in nature, provide the JFC's 
competence regarding transboundary fish stocks. Article 1 of the 1976 Agreement refers to 
the area beyond 12 nautical miles from the baselines in which each of the parties is engaged in 
the management of living resources. This means that the Agreement also applies to the 
management of fish stocks in the FPZ around Svalbard. 
It is unclear from the text of the 1976 Agreement that its provisions deal with shared fish 
stocks in the Barents Sea. This is inferred from the fact that such fish stocks occur exclusively 
within a party's zone.
65
 Article 7 (b) of this Agreement is related to straddling fish stocks. 
Article 7 (c) refers to other fish stocks which have mutual dependence with the mentioned. 
Thus, the 1976 Agreement is not aimed at the management of highly migratory fish stocks in 
the Barents Sea.  
In accordance with Article 2 of the 1976 Agreement the main tasks of the Commission are to 
set TACs for the transboundary fish stocks and to distribute quotas. 
The TACs are established for the main fish stocks, namely cod, haddock, capelin, Greenland 
halibut and other species, and are based on the recommendations from the ICES.
66
 The quotas 
include mutual quotas in each parties' EEZs, quotas for the third countries and quotas for 
research and management purposes.
67
 For instance, while mutual quotas for cod and haddock 
are shared between Norway and Russia on an equal basis (50-50), the quota for capelin is 
shared 60-40 in the favor of Norway.
68
 Moreover, the JFC conducts exchange of quotas which 




Furthermore, the JFC is involved in fisheries regulation more widely
70
 and in enforcement 
and compliance control. Norway and Russia report their commercial catches and exchange 
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information between the enforcement bodies
71
 to avoid illegally fishing. In addition, the 
NEAFC's Port State Control was implemented (e.g. the prohibitions of landings of fish taken 
without a quota, the blacklisting vessels with a history of unregulated fishing). 
 
3. 2 Format of the cooperation in the Barents Sea 
States shall comply with the obligation to cooperate concerning transboundary fish stocks 
either directly or through appropriate organizations according to the LOSC.
72
 As regards 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, the FSA develops the obligation to 
cooperate stated under Articles 63 (2), 64 and 118 of the LOSC. 
In other words, shared fish stocks migrating within the Norwegian and the Russian EEZs are 
not subject to the FSA. However, its provisions are significant for other transboundary fish 
stocks of the Barents Sea. Despite of the fact that the JFC was established before the adoption 
of the FSA, the two coastal states are required to implement its provisions as parties of this 
Agreement. 
Part III of the FSA contains the provisions for mechanisms of cooperation in the conservation 
and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Article 8 of the 
FSA spells out the duty to cooperate either directly or through arrangements or (sub)regional 
fisheries management organizations (RFMO), which must if necessary be created. 
While the paragraph 1 of this Article can be considered as a choice of states to cooperate, the 
following paragraphs set out some restrictions on such freedom. 
If particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks are regulated by a RFMO or 
an arrangement, the relevant coastal states and states fishing for the stocks shall become 
members of this organization or participants of this arrangement. Although states may choose 
not to join the RFMO or not to participate in the arrangement, they have an obligation to 
apply measures adopted by such RFMO or such arrangement.
73
 
If there is no any RFMO or arrangement competent to regulate the fishery for the target fish 
stocks, the relevant coastal states and fishing states are obligated to establish either a RFMO 
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or an arrangement. These states shall participate in the work either as members or participants 
or by applying the measures established by the new organization or arrangement.
74
 
Only membership in the RFMO or participation in the arrangement or agreement to apply of 
their measures can grant access of states to fisheries resources to which those measures 
apply.
75
 According to Article 17 (2) of the FSA states, which are non-members or non-
participants and do not agree to apply the measures adopted by the RFMO or the arrangement, 
shall not authorize their vessels to engage in fisheries for the straddling or highly migratory 
fish stocks. 
In summary, in accordance with the provisions of the FSA exclusive competence to regulate 




A purpose of different formats of cooperation is to fulfill the obligation of states to cooperate 
concerning management of transboundary fish stocks. The choice between the forms can 
probably depend on the complexity of the regime, the number of fish stocks and states 
involved.
77
 Moreover, such choice also predetermines legal consequences. For instance, 
implications may be related to enforcement.
78
  
Since the FSA refers to the three ways of organizing cooperation directly or through a RFMO 
or an arrangement, it is a reason to assume that they have some differences. Try to distinguish 
between them based on the example of the JFC. 
Is the JFC an arrangement in accordance with the FSA? 
Consideration the JFC as an arrangement should satisfy some conditions under the FSA. 
Firstly, the JFC should consist of separate organs through which states can fulfill their 
cooperation and conservation obligations. This is a major factor which distinguishes an 
arrangement as well as a RFMO from a direct cooperation. Secondly, the JFC shall have the 
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competence to adopt conservation and management measures for particular fish stocks on the 
high seas which are binding for states. 
Since Article 1 of the FSA provides the definition of an arrangement, its wording must be 
emphasized. An arrangement is a cooperative mechanism established under the LOSC and the 
FSA by two or more states for the conservation and management of one or more straddling 
fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks in a (sub)region. 
Undoubtedly, the JFC is a cooperative mechanism in the Barents Sea. It is clear that this 
cooperative mechanism can be established by two states. Hence, it seems as an 
incomprehensible conclusion in the literature that the cooperation which involves only two 
states should be considered as a direct cooperation.
79
 Moreover, the JFC manages such 
straddling fish stock of the Barents Sea as the Northeast Atlantic cod. 
The criteria of an arrangement are met under the cooperation through the JFC. However, a 
question is whether the JFC corresponds to the meaning which the FSA puts in an 
arrangement. It was underlined above which requirements the JFC should satisfy to be an 
arrangement under the FSA. They will be considered in turn. 
Norway and Russia have established a separate body, namely the JFC, to fulfill their 
obligation to cooperate. Furthermore, the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for 
management and control within the fisheries sector and some working groups were 
established under the JFC.
80
 Therefore, the cooperation through the JFC is more 
institutionalized than a direct cooperation and cannot be considered as such format of the 
cooperation. 
The presence of the organs meets the condition that applies to a RFMO or an arrangement in 
conformity with the FSA. A RFMO or an arrangement should have some sort of mechanism 
to perform functions listed in Article 10 of the FSA, inter alia, to allocate TAC, to promote 
and conduct scientific assessment of fish stocks, to control and enforce. It is not mentioned 
that these functions are assigned to a direct cooperation.
81
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While the definition of an arrangement is given in the FSA, neither the LOSC nor the FSA 
contains the content of a RFMO. However, level of a RFMO's organization is different from 
an arrangement. These organizations are usually established by states under a convention and 
are more structured by different bodies (e. g. a secretariat or headquarters) and separate 
decision-making mechanism. The NEAFC is a clear example for such RFMO in the Barents 
Sea.
82
 One can hardly argue that the JFC can be considered as a RFMO. The 1975 and 1976 
Agreements did not have the intention to provide the JFC with the status of a RFMO.
83
 
In spite of the fact that the first condition is met, it does not allow to suggest that the JFC is an 
arrangement under the FSA. The second condition has to be considered. If the JFC is an 
arrangement, this implies its exclusive competence over transboundary fish stocks applicable 
also on the high seas. Bearing in mind that the concept of an arrangement was introduced in 
the FSA by a proposal of Norway concerning the JFC as such example
84
, the discussion in 
this direction will be continued. If the JFC can indeed be considered as an arrangement under 
the FSA, it means that various consequences which attach to this format of cooperation will 
follow. 
There is no unambiguous opinion in the legal literature on how the JFC should be considered 
according to the provision of the FSA. Some authors have argued that the cooperation through 
the JFC is an arrangement.
85
 Olav Stokke has pointed out that the Barents Sea regime, 
including the JFC and cluster of external agreements with other states, is clearly an 
arrangement according to the FSA.
86
 This bilateral regime provides a decision-making 
mechanism through its organs.
87
 However, an alternative point of view has been presented by 
Robin Churchill. He means that neither the JFC nor the agreements with other states are an 
arrangement. Arguments are that there is no decision-making mechanism and it is not 
established for the purpose of high seas management of straddling stocks.
88
 Tore Henriksen 
has concluded that the JFC can hardly be considered as an arrangement.
89
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According to our discussion the conclusion that the JFC is an arrangement under the FSA 
context cannot be made yet. 
Is the JFC competent to regulate the Loophole fisheries? 
A question which was consequently raised is whether the JFC is competent to regulate the 
Loophole fisheries. Therefore, the 1975 and 1976 Agreements have to be viewed. 
They refer to the areas under national jurisdiction of Norway and Russia.
90
 In other words, it 
means that the JFC only deals with fish stocks that occur in the EEZs. However, there is a 
simplification to conclude that the JFC is not appropriate body to manage fish stocks in the 
Loophole and that its functions should be transferred to the NEAFC.
91
 Interpretation of the 
Agreements should not be limited by this. 
Norway and Russia commit themselves to cooperate concerning straddling fish stocks under 
Article 7 (b) of the 1976 Agreement. It can be read that the JFC was established to adopt 
measures also for the high seas. However, the clause of this Article that the cooperation 
between Norway and Russia should be "directly and through appropriate international 
organizations" casts doubt on such reading. Tore Henriksen has argued that this suggests that 
the cooperation between the coastal states should not be through the JFC.
92
 Not sure that the 
wording should be interpreted this way and that two coastal states had in mind an exclusion of 
the JFC from the high seas. 
It is important to note that the Loophole was not attractive fisheries area when the 1975 and 
1976 Agreements were concluded. Fishing in such enclave of the high seas started in 1990s.
93
 
This could be a reason of the unclear wording in Article 7 of the 1976 Agreement. 
Provisions of the 1976 Agreement are to be submitted by a contextual interpretation.
94
 To this 
respect, the JFC practice is relevant. Tore Henriksen has pointed out that the JFC through its 
practice is authorized to regulate fishing in the Loophole.
95
 In that light the Protocols of the 
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JFC have to be considered. According to them the measures apply to the Northeast Atlantic 
cod (and haddock) throughout its migratory range
96
 which implies the Loophole. 
In summary, the JFC is entitled to apply its conservation and management measures to 
Norwegian and Russian vessels fishing in the Loophole. Besides these coastal states, other 
states have the freedom to fish in this part of the high seas in accordance with the LOSC. 
Therefore, the fisheries agreements of Norway and Russia with other non-coastal states 
should be analyzed. It helps to answer a question of whether the fisheries regulation of the 
JFC applies to third states fishing in the Loophole. 
 
3. 3 Principles of the cooperation in the Barents Sea 
3. 3. 1 Access of third states to fish stocks of the Barents Sea 
The fist maritime zone where access of other states to fish stocks of the Barents Sea can be 
granted is the EEZ. 
When the TACs for fish stocks within the EEZ are determined under Article 61 of the LOSC, 
coastal states may be faced with the question of whether the access to such stocks should be 
given to other states, and if so, under what conditions. 
According to Article 62 of the LOSC Norway and Russia shall allow other states access to 
catch the surplus
97
 (the difference between the TAC and the catch capacity of the coastal 
state). Even if there is no surplus of fish stocks, the coastal state can be interested in such 
permitting. It gives an opportunity to its vessels to catch in the EEZ of the third state if stocks 
are not found in the coastal state's own waters. 
Despite of the mandatory wording "shall", the LOSC leaves flexibility on which states should 
be granted access. The relevant factors that should be taken into account in such deciding are 
outlined in Article 62 (3) of the LOSC. Moreover, the access to the surplus, through 
agreements, shall be pursuant to the terms and conditions referred to Article 62 (4).
98
 This list 
is not limited as long as the laws and regulations are in conformity with the provisions of the 
LOSC. The terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of the coastal state 
are its solely decisions. Other states are required to comply with them.
99
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It was underlined that other states enjoy the freedom to fish beyond the EEZs. If the JFC is 
entitled to adopt its measures mandatory for other non-costal states fishing in the Loophole, 
another condition for the JFC as an arrangement will be met. 
Fisheries agreements between the coastal states and third states  
In addition to the 1975 and 1976 Agreements between Norway and Russia, these states have 
fisheries agreements with other states. The EU, Greenland, Iceland, Faroe Islands have the 
access to allocate quotas for fish stocks in different zones in the Barents Sea.
100
 Fish quotas of 
third states are set by the JFC for cod, haddock and Greenland halibut within both the EEZs of 
the coastal states and the FPZ.
101
 
The trilateral Loophole Agreement between Norway, Russia and Iceland
102
 has a central role 
in our discussion. In accordance with its provisions the access to fish quotas is granted in the 
respective EEZs.
103
 However, Iceland has committed itself to refrain from the fishing for the 
Northeast Atlantic cod in the Loophole. It flows from the fact that parties of the Loophole 
Agreement have recognized that fish quotas should to be based "on management decisions 
taken by the coastal states".
104
 Since these management decisions are adopted by Norway and 
Russia within the JFC, Iceland has therefore accepted the competence of the JFC to manage 
this straddling fish stock. In addition to a restriction of the catches by fish quotas, Article 4 of 
the Agreement contains deprivation of any claim for fish stocks which are allocated in the 
EEZs. 
Any conclusion of the bilateral agreements with other states, namely the EU, Greenland and 
Faroe Islands, means that these states are obligated to limit themselves by the established 
quotas, regardless of whether they are fishing within or outside fisheries jurisdiction of 
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 Furthermore, the coastal states have agreed to continue control over 
the third states so that their fishing is to be stopped when the quotas are fished.
106
 
Thus, it can indirectly mean that the JFC is competent to regulate the Loophole fisheries of 
third states for straddling fish stocks. 
Irene Vanja Dahl has argued that the conservation and management measures of the JFC are 
binding for third states.
107
 If it is so, one can agree with her that the JFC is an arrangement in 
accordance with the FSA.
108
 Another condition for the consideration of the JFC as an 
arrangement will be satisfied. However, if the measures of the Commission are not binding, it 
does not automatically mean that the JFC is a direct cooperation under the FSA. 
Third states as well as the coastal states fishing for straddling fish stocks in the Loophole have 
the obligation to cooperate.
109
 Such obligation has been fulfilled by them directly through the 
tri- or bilateral fisheries agreements.
110
 These agreements aim at control by the coastal states 
over fishing for straddling fish stocks in the Loophole. Norway and Russia singly impose 
certain restrictions on other states. Third states have been permitted to fish within the 
Norwegian and the Russian EEZs with the assumption that they are not involved in the 
Loophole fisheries for straddling cod stock. 
The JFC is not competent to regulate fishing on the high seas in the Barents Sea. Its measures 
have an indirect effect in the Loophole because third states have recognized the coastal states' 
responsibility to manage straddling fish stocks. Since the JFC has not an separate 
responsibility over straddling fish stocks in the Loophole, it is questionable to consider the 
Commission as an arrangement in accordance with the FSA. 
Thus, I support the conclusion made by Tore Henriksen that the JFC is more a cooperation 
between the coastal states regarding conservation and management of shared fish than an 
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arrangement under the context inferred in the FSA. It is left to the single coastal state to 
ensure control over the third states' fishing in the Loophole.
111
 
It has not been concluded that the JFC is an arrangement. Otherwise, the JFC has to deal with 
the access of non-coastal states to fish stocks. 
Under the FSA only states that join the regime or agree to apply its conservation and 
management measures are to have access to fish stocks.
112
 Hence, other states have a right to 
be included in the fisheries management in the Barents Sea. The FSA contains a requirement 
that states "having a real interest in the fisheries" may become participants of the 
arrangement.
113
 It is debatable what a "real interest" implies.
114
 This thesis does not aim to 
analyze such wording. However, it seems that "real" indicates that states must demonstrate 
they have some factual or concrete interest in the fisheries. In other words, states without any 
intention of fishing on the fish stocks on the high seas are excluded from becoming 
participants from the outset.
115
 
There are no states which demand the participation in the JFC. It may be related to the 
objective of the Commission. Since the JFC mainly manages shared fish stocks, the 
participation in the JFC is not attractive for other states.
116
 As long as other states are not the 
participants of the JFC, they have no way than to consent to apply the measures of the 
Commission. This gives them an opportunity to be engaged in the fishing for straddling fish 
stocks in the Barents Sea according to the FSA. The (tri)bilateral agreements may be 
considered as such consent. 
Anyway, stability and effectiveness of the Barents Sea fisheries regime depend on perceiving 
by other relevant states. Different fisheries agreements of the coastal states provide such 
legitimate basis. 
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3. 3. 2 Application of the precautionary approach through the Joint Norwegian-Russian 
Fisheries Commission 
Obligation to cooperate is directed at the coastal states which must implement the other 
conservation obligations through the JFC. States are required to ensure that their measures are 
based on the best scientific evidence available and to apply precautionary approach.
117
 There 
are the principles on which the fisheries management in the Barents Sea should be based.
118
 
Norway and Russia have accepted the application of the precautionary approach to the 
fisheries management by their ratification of the CBD, the FSA. This approach under the 
ICES recommendations applies to fish stocks governed by the JFC in the Barents Sea.
119
 
Moreover, the precautionary approach has been included in Article 4 (3) of the Barents Sea 
Treaty which will be considered in the part 4. 2 of the thesis. 
Current part has a goal to examine the application of the precautionary approach to 
transboundary fish stocks in the Barents Sea before the analysis of the Barents Sea Treaty 
concerning this approach. 
For the first time the precautionary approach has been introduced in the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development.
120
 It states that scientific uncertainty should not be a 
reason to postpone measures to prevent environmental harm. After the endorsement of the 
precautionary approach, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization considered that it is 
important to identify its practical meaning and implications for fisheries because some 
organizations had started using this approach as a justification to close down fisheries and as 
an argument to dismiss the role of science in fisheries management.
121
 Consequently, the 
precautionary approach was reflected explicitly or implicitly in numerous international 
instruments. There are the CBD
122
, the FSA and others
123
 which provide how the 
precautionary approach should be applied. 
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In giving effect to the obligation of coastal states to cooperate, Article 5 (c) of the FSA 
defines the application of the precautionary approach as one of the main principles in the 
conservation and management of fish stocks. It is further elaborated in Article 6 and Annex II. 
According to Article 6 (1) of the FSA the precautionary approach shall be applied "widely to 
conservation, management and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in 
order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine environment". Besides 
the absence of adequate scientific information on the fish stocks, uncertainty concerning 
environmental and socio-economic conditions is also relevant.
124
 This means that states 
should evaluate different risks for fish stocks which can include risk of overfishing, risk of 
negative economic effects for fisheries communities and others.
125
 
Thus, according to the provisions of the FSA Norway and Russia are obligated to apply the 
precautionary approach concerning straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in 
the Barents Sea. It seems that the Northeast Atlantic cod is subject to such application through 
the cooperation in the JFC and shared fish stocks are uncovered by this approach. In this 
regard, the practice of the JFC concerning the application of the precautionary approach 
should be considered. 
The JFC's practice of the application of the precautionary approach 
When states under the obligation to cooperate establish an arrangement or an RFMO, they 
shall agree on the mechanism which will obtain scientific advice and review the status of the 
fish stock.
126
 To this effect, a scientific advisory body can be set up. However, there is not a 
mandatory requirement. Scientific information can be obtained in other ways. It may be done 
by another body such as the ICES which performs such functions. Hence, this requirement 
can also be met under the cooperation directly.
127
 
"The main principles and criteria the long-term, sustainable management of living marine  
resources in the Barents and the Norwegian seas"
128
 is a basis for decision-making by the 
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 In this regard , the JFC is developing the management strategies concerning the target 
fish stocks under the ICES.
130
 
Protocols of the JFC show that the JFC has applied the precautionary approach based on ICES 
recommendations through its practice.
131
 Annual recommendations to the JFC are given by 
the ICES through its Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management. The application of the 
precautionary approach through the JFC is related to various fish stocks in the Barents Sea. 
The Commission extends this application to shared fish stocks, whereas they are not subject to 
the provisions of the FSA.
132
 
The ICES is an intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to coordinate 
scientific research and to use this for generating advice on fisheries management.
133
 Although 
the FSA contains the general provisions related to the formulation and use of scientific advice, 
the ICES has developed and implemented a specific procedure to provide advice for the 
various fish stocks in the Northeast Atlantic. However, while the FSA includes legally 
binding commitments to conduct and use scientific research in precautionary way, the ICES 
advice does not have binding nature. 
Thus, the ICES recommendations can be ignored by the JFC. For instance, a Russian request 
for a change of a precautionary reference point for Northeast Atlantic cod was rejected by the 
ICES. It was made because "the data available at present give no firms basis for revision of 
reference points".
134
 Even if the JFC may take a view that the ICES generates advice which is 
unreasonably sensitive to the socio-economic considerations, the coastal states are obligated 
under the FSA to establish fisheries measures in line with the precautionary approach. 
Actually, the past measures of the JFC can be evaluated as insufficient. It was a tendency to 
set TACs far above the recommendations by the ICES.
135
 In 1999, the JFC established a TAC 
for the Northeast Atlantic cod equal 480 thousand tonnes, above a recommended by the ICES 
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 One year later, the JFC set a TAC of 390 thousand tonnes, while the 
ICES recommended 110 thousand tonnes.
137
 Possible reasons why the JFC chose to set quotas 
above the level ICES considered precautionary were explained by Geir Hønneland.
138
 Distrust 
in these recommendations or scepticism among Russian experts towards the application of the 
precautionary approach might be relevant factors. While the Norwegian delegation seems to 
have partly supported the opinion expressed by the ICES, the Russians have opposed it.
139
 
Such discrepancy between established and recommended TACs could lead to serious 
consequences. Fish stocks collapse would probably have happened. However, nowadays the 
JFC ended the practice of ignoring the scientific advice and started to pay more heed to the 
precautionary approach. 
In the next chapter implications of including the precautionary approach in the Barents Sea 
Treaty for the management of transboundary fish stocks will be considered. 
 
3. 3. 3 Other principles of the cooperation  
The precautionary approach goes beyond the objective of Article 2 of the FSA. In accordance 
with Article 6 (1) of the FSA Norway and Russia shall apply this approach in order to 
preserve the marine environment. In addition to the general obligation to preserve the marine 
environment
140
, there is a reference to the obligation to protect biodiversity in the marine 
environment. It is one of the general principles set out in Article 5 of the FSA.
141
 Reasonable 
to argue that this is a linkage with the CBD which defines what biodiversity is. 
Besides the already discussed obligation of the coastal states to cooperate, Norway and Russia 
are obligated to conserve all kind of biodiversity and to ensure sustainable use of its 
components according to the CBD.
142
 However, the wording of the CBD Articles such as "as 
far as possible and as appropriate"
143
 or "in accordance with its particular conditions and 
capabilities"
144
 reduces the significance of the established commitments. 
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Fish stocks are an element of biodiversity in the Barents Sea marine ecosystem. Although the 
CBD recognizes the obligations of each coastal state to conserve biodiversity and to ensure 
sustainable use of its components, it is stated in the Preamble of the CBD that "the 
conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind" and is a global 
environmental responsibility.
145
 There is a need for joint efforts of different states because 
fish are no respecters of their jurisdictional boundaries. 
Stated in the CBD obligations are directed at the application of a holistic approach
146
 in 
fisheries management of two coastal states. The examined precautionary approach and the 
ecosystem approach
147
 are developed on the basis of these obligations. 
The Barents Sea marine ecosystem should be considered as a whole. Status of fish stocks is 
dependent on the sustainability of other elements of biodiversity. Thus, fish stocks have be 
protected by Norway and Russia in conjunction with other species belonging to the same 
marine ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon them. Both coastal states under their 
cooperation through the JFC are required to consider effects on such species.
148
 Furthermore, 
this requirement is elaborated in order to conserve and manage straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. Several of the general principles in Article 5 of the FSA are aimed at 




Requirement of compatibility between measures established in the Barents Sea 
The bilateral management regime of the Barents Sea includes different jurisdictional 
boundaries which imply different fisheries regimes. In conditions where the geographical 
distribution of fish stocks does not correspond to the established maritime zones, Norway, 
Russia and other states fishing on the high seas are faced with the problem how to ensure the 
effective management of transboundary fish stocks.  
Some of transboundary fish stocks are subject to the EEZ regime, but most of them are under 
the right of all states to fish on the high seas. In spite of difference between two fisheries 
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regimes, it is important to acknowledge the unity of the Barents Sea ecosystem, regardless of 
the zonal division. To this respect, the FSA requirement of compatibility between measures 
within these maritime zones has an important role.
150
 
States involved in the management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
in the Barents Sea are obliged not just to cooperate, they have to cooperate in order to achieve 
compatible measures for these stocks.
151
 Besides taking into account different factors in such 
achieving
152
, Norway and Russia shall also ensure that the fisheries permitted through the 
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4 Implications of the Barents Sea Treaty for the coastal states' obligations 
 
4. 1 Consequences for the status of maritime zones around Svalbard 
4. 1. 1 Fisheries jurisdiction of Svalbard 
Status of the established maritime zones around Svalbard determines the content of fisheries 
jurisdiction within such boundaries. This part of the chapter examines the status of these 
zones off Svalbard. Subsequently, it helps to suggest whether the Barents Sea Treaty can be 
interpreted as Russian acknowledgement that Norway is entitled to establish the full range of 
maritime zones around Svalbard. 
The status of Svalbard is clarified under the Spitsbergen Treaty. The archipelago was a terra 
nullius
154
 earlier. It means that its territory has not been subject to the sovereignty of any state. 
Under the Spitsbergen Treaty the full and absolute sovereignty was conferred on Norway.
155
 
Other states accepted the provisions about sovereignty subject to the several stipulations, 
including an equal right to fish in the "territorial waters" of Svalbard.
156
 Furthermore, Article 
3 of the Spitsbergen Treaty gives a right to exercise fisheries jurisdiction within these waters. 
Status of the territorial waters around Svalbard 
The concept of "territorial waters" is not specified in the Spitsbergen Treaty. The reason is 
that this term was widely used in international law when the Treaty was concluded. Any other 
maritime zones were not recognized at the time of the adoption of the Spitsbergen Treaty. The 
International Law Commission referred to this concept and stated that it was used for internal 
waters only, and for both internal waters and the territorial sea.
157
 For instance, Norway still 
uses such wording in its legislation. The territorial waters of Norway include the territorial sea 
and internal waters.
158
 It also applies to Svalbard.
159
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Some Russian authors, nevertheless, make a legal distinction between the traditional 
institution of the territorial sea and the "territorial waters of territories".
160
 Their point of view 
is that Norway cannot change the boundaries defined as a rectangle with a reference to two 
lines of longitude and latitude
161
, known as the "Svalbard box". They argue that the waters 
within this box are the territorial waters under the context of the Spitsbergen Treaty. There is 
the high seas beyond these box's limits. 
However, such arguments are rather problematic. The sides of the Svalbard box do not 
constitute jurisdictional boundaries in the accepted sense and are irrelevant to establish 
maritime zones around Svalbard. The rules of international law regarding establishment of 
maritime zones should be applied to the regime within the box. It is sovereignty over Svalbard 
that includes the powers to determine the breath of the territorial sea and to establish maritime 




Furthermore, these arguments cannot be confirmed by the Russian official opinion. Such 
mention is not found. There is only Russian court practice which refers to the area beyond the 
territorial sea of Svalbard as the high seas.
163
 
Thus, Russia accepts the establishment of the territorial sea off Svalbard. It logically flows 
from the sovereignty of Norway under the Spitsbergen Treaty. According to Article 2 of this 
Treaty Russia as well as other parties enjoys the equal right to fish in the Svalbard's territorial 
waters.  
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Status of the FPZ around Svalbard 
Another maritime zone beyond the territorial sea is the FPZ established by Norway under its 
sovereignty over Svalbard. The FPZ is a 200 nautical miles maritime zone measured from the 
baselines of Svalbard.
164
 According to the Regulations Norway refrained from the 
establishment of the EEZ even if the coastal state was entitled to do that.
165
 There is a clear 
signal that Norway wanted to avoid confrontation with other states fishing in the FPZ.
166
 
Consequently, general ban on foreign fishing under the Law on the Norwegian EEZ
167
 is not 
applied to the FPZ. 
Norway adopted some measures within the FPZ. In accordance with Article 3 of the 
Regulations Norway may establish TACs, closed areas, minimum mesh sizes and others. 
Vessels fishing in the FPZ are required to keep a catch log-book and to report the 
commencement, the end of their fishing and the amount of catch.
168
 
As regards to the FPZ, it has been indicated in the Note of the Embassy of the USSR on 15 
June 1977 that the decision to establish the FPZ was in nonconformity with obligations 
assumed by Norway under the Spitsbergen Treaty.
169
 Russia as the successor of the USSR 
still does not recognize this establishment. Russia takes the view that the Spitsbergen Treaty 
does not grant Norway the right to establish maritime zones beyond the 12 nautical miles 
from baselines of Svalbard. 
However, not only the establishment of the FPZ has been challenged by Russia. Russia casts 
doubt on the jurisdiction of Norway as a coastal state in the FPZ. Russia considers that 




The validity of such claim should be assessed. For this purpose, look at Article 2 (2) of the 
Spitsbergen Treaty which gives Norway legislative jurisdiction to adopt fisheries measures 
and to apply them on a nondiscriminatory basis. One can agree with Robin R. Churchill and 
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 that although there is no clear reference to enforcement jurisdiction, Norway 
must have a power to enforce the possible measures together with a power to decree them. 
Anyway, the coastal state jurisdiction of Norway follows from its sovereignty over Svalbard 
under Article 1 of the Spitsbergen Treaty. There are the mentioned stipulations which prevent 
Norway to exercise the full coastal state jurisdiction. As it was noted above the sovereignty 
was recognized by other states, subject to the equal right to fish. Developments in the law of 
the sea have given rise to a question of whether this right applies beyond the territorial sea. 
The position of Norway has been expressed in the numerous Government papers over the 
years.
172
 Norway considers that the Spitsbergen Treaty applies solely to the land and the 
territorial sea and that Norway is entitled to exercise the normal rights of a coastal state under 
international law over the maritime zones beyond the territorial sea. Such view is based on a 
strict interpretation which should be given to the Spitsbergen Treaty when the geographical 
application is determined. 
Thus, Norway argues that the equal right of states to fish does not apply beyond the territorial 
sea
173
, whereas a number of other states take the opposite point of view. There are Russia, 
Iceland, Spain and others.
174
 It seems that there is no way in the attitudes of other states 




If the Spitsbergen Treaty applies in the FPZ around Svalbard, the main consequence for the 
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4. 1. 2 The Barents Sea Treaty as recognition by Russia that Svalbard generates the full 
range of maritime zones 
It was mentioned, Russia has challenged the establishment of maritime zones around 
Svalbard. The thesis raises the question of whether the Barents Sea Treaty can be read as 
Russian recognition that maritime zones around Svalbard are not prevented by the 
Spitsbergen Treaty. 
To this regards, let's try to draw a parallel with the 2006 Agreement between Norway and 
Denmark.
177
 This Agreement is clearly based on the relevant coastline of Svalbard
178
 which is 
formed by Spitsbergen as the main island and the island of Prins Karls Forland, which lies 
some 10 kilometers to the west of Spitsbergen.
179
 However, neither the joint statement nor the 
Barents Sea Treaty contains information about the Spitsbergen archipelago or any of its 
islands as the relevant coasts.
180
 
Anyway, the Barents Sea Treaty would be based on the relevant coastline of Svalbard.
181
 
Moreover, Russia accepted the delimitation line to the east of the claimed sector line. In 
accordance with Article 2 of the Barents Sea Treaty both states commit themselves to abide 
by the agreed line and not to have claims beyond it. This allows suggesting that Russia 





 support this opinion. They mean that by the signing of the 
Barents Sea Treaty Russia disavows its legal position and actually accepts the establishment 
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 However, the official state view is that the Barents Sea Treaty cannot be read as 
such recognition.
185
 Consequently, Russia follows its court practice that the area beyond the 
territorial sea of Svalbard is identified as the high seas.
186
 
Thus, Russia argues that there are no changes in its legal position regarding Svalbard. Russian 
Government refers to Article 6 of the Barents Sea Treaty so that this Treaty is not prejudice to 
the rights and obligations under the Spitsbergen Treaty.
187
 To this effect, legal meaning of the 
mentioned Article should be considered: can the reservation of rights and obligations under 
other international treaties to which both Norway and Russia are parties be read as a 
hindrance to establish the maritime zones around Svalbard? 
It was concluded earlier (part 4.1.1) that the right of Norway to claim the maritime zones 
around Svalbard flows from its sovereignty over the archipelago. Norway is entitled to 
establish maritime zones off Svalbard as any other state regarding its territory over which this 
state has sovereignty. Such conclusion is consistent with international law which the Barents 
Sea Treaty is based on.
188
 Furthermore, the delimitation line is closely related to Svalbard as 
the relevant coast. This goes to support the view that Svalbard generates these zones. Hence, 
it is questionable that Article 6 needs to be interpreted in the context referenced by Russia. 
Article 6 of the Barents Sea Treaty makes sense by another interpretation. The Barents Sea 
Treaty shall not prejudice the equal right to fish stated in the Spitsbergen Treaty. This again 
raises the question of whether the Spitsbergen Treaty applies to the maritime zones beyond 
the territorial sea. Russian recognition of the FPZ's establishment does not necessarily mean 
that Russia accepts full coastal state jurisdiction of Norway within such zone. The question of 
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the application of the Spitsbergen Treaty provisions for the access to fish stocks within the 
FPZ is still unresolved. 
 
4. 2 Consequences for the obligations of Norway and Russia 
Obligation of Norway and Russia to cooperate with regard to the management of 
transboundary fish stocks in the Barents Sea 
The obligation of the coastal states to cooperate regarding transboundary fish stocks was 
discussed in the third chapter. This obligation has been reflected in the Barents Sea Treaty. 
According to Article 1 of Annex I of the Barents Sea Treaty Norway and Russia commit 
themselves to continue their cooperation through the JFC and to keep the 1975 and 1976 
Agreements in force at least for fifteen years. The same commitment is stated in the Protocols 
from the 39th and the 40th sessions of the JFC. 
The main tasks of the Commission have been reiterated in the Barents Sea Treaty.
189
 The JFC, 
since the start of its work, has dealt with technical issues regarding, in particular, mesh width 
in nets and minimum size of catches.
190
 However, by agreeing on the delimitation line each of 
the parties got a right to set such technical regulations unilaterally within the 200 nautical 
miles from their baselines.
191
 Article 2 of Annex I establishes a transitional period of two 
years for the implementation of this provision. 
Obligation to apply the precautionary approach 
This part of the current chapter aims at to show how the application of the precautionary 
approach examined above has been amended by the Barents Sea Treaty. 
The Barents Sea Treaty reiterated the obligation of Norway and Russia to apply the 
precautionary approach. The wording of Article 4 (3) of the Barents Sea Treaty and Article 6 
(1) of the FSA is almost identical, except for one distinction. While the precautionary 
approach under the FSA applies to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the Barents 
Sea Treaty extends this application to shared fish stocks. 
The precautionary approach is mainly used by the JFC for the management of such straddling 
fish stock as cod. However, according to the Protocols of the JFC stocks of haddock are also 
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managed by the application of this approach.
192
 In other words, such approach has been in fact 
applied to shared fish stocks in conformity with the ICES recommendations. 
Under Article 4 (3) of the Barents Sea Treaty Norway and Russia are obligated to apply the 
precautionary approach to all categories of shared fish stocks, including capelin and others. 
Furthermore, the coastal states have strengthened it as a legally binding instrument through 
the JFC. 
Besides shared fish stocks, straddling fish stocks are subject to the application the 
precautionary approach in accordance with Article 4 (3) of the Barents Sea. It confirms the 
competence of the JFC regarding these fish stocks stated in the 1976 Agreement. Moreover, 
the wording of the Article contains a linkage between the precautionary approach and the 
obligation to protect marine biodiversity. The principles of the cooperation through the JFC 
which were considered in 3.3.3 will follow. 
The Barents Sea Treaty is a part of Russian and Norwegian legal systems equally with other 
national provisions which deal specifically with issues of fisheries management. While 
Norway includes the precautionary approach in its legislation
193
, Russian legislation does not 
mention such approach. Reference to precaution is found neither in the Federal Law on the 
Russian EEZ
194
 nor in the Federal Law on fishery and conservation marine biological 
resources.
195
 However, it does not mean that the Russian fisheries management regime has 
failed to move the precautionary direction. 
The FSA and the Barents Sea Treaty have higher position in the legal hierarchy, even if they 
can contain other rules than those envisaged by national law.
196
 Moreover, the Federal 
Fisheries Agency as Russian representative in the JFC issues Decrees for implementation of 
the JFC decisions based on the precautionary approach.
197
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Thus, notwithstanding that the precautionary approach is not formally stated in Russian 
fisheries legislation, Russia commits itself to apply this approach cornering all categories of 
transboundary fish stocks in accordance with the FSA and the Barents Sea Treaty. The 
precautionary approach shall be applied, regardless of whether fish stocks occur within the 
EEZ or beyond it. 
Access of other states to fish stocks of the Barents Sea 
The Barents Sea Treaty generates the mutual obligations of the two coastal states. Generally, 
any Treaty creates neither obligations nor rights for a third state without its consent.
198
 The 
Barents Sea Treaty however has implications for the access of third states to fish stocks. 
Since the "grey zone" has been absorbed partly by the Norwegian EEZ and partly the Russian 
EEZ, the establishment of the delimitation line by the Barents Sea Treaty provides Norway 
and Russia with the sovereign rights over fish stocks and the jurisdiction as the coastal states 
over foreign-flagged fishing vessels. 
The reservation of rights and obligations under other international treaties to which both 
Norway and Russia are parties
199
 clearly means that these states will keep on to allocate the 
quotas for other states fishing in the Barents Sea. Thus, the Barents Sea Treaty refers to the 
already considered fisheries agreements between the coastal states and third states. 
The Barents Sea Treaty expands the area of the high seas in the Barents Sea. It is stated in the 
Proposition of the Norwegian Government to Stortinget.
200
 Furthermore, the Proposition 
confirms the conclusion of part 3.2 that the fisheries measures of the JFC apply to the 
Loophole.
201
 It raises again the question of whether these measures are directly binding to 
third states. 
The commitment of Norway and Russia to continue cooperation through the JFC is related to 
their "mutual quotas" in the EEZs of each other.
202
 Since Annex I does not provide a linkage 
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with the access of third states, the clause of Article 6 should be read in this context. The single 
coastal state controls the fishing on the high seas through its agreements with other states. 
Thus, it is questionable whether the conservation and management measures of the JFC are 
directly binding for them. Likely, these measures have an indirect effect on the high seas. 
Therefore, the JFC can hardly be considered as an arrangement in accordance with the 
provisions of the FSA. 
 
4. 3 Application of the Barents Sea Treaty to fisheries matters in consequence of climate 
change in the Barents Sea 
The Barents Sea ecosystem is in good shape and many of the commercial fish stocks have a 
high productivity.
203
 However, air temperature in the Arctic has increased almost twice the 
global average.
204
 In this situation it is predicted that seasonal sea ice in the Barents Sea will 
decrease or disappear.
205
 Due to such rapid climate change, various changes in the Barents 
Sea marine ecosystem are expected. 
A possible consequence of climate change is that the size and the number of transboundary 
fish stocks increase, due to a better supply of food and a large ice-free area in the Barents 
Sea.
206
 Hence, fishing for the coastal states and other states within the considered maritime 
boundaries of the Barents Sea may be more attractive. As a result, it could lead to more 
conflicts over states' fishing rights. Quota regulations for other transboundary fish stocks 
could also be necessary. Boreal species such as blue whiting and mackerel may become 
common in the Barents Sea.
207
 
Another most likely expectation is a more northeasterly distribution of fish stocks
208
, being 
less available to Norway. This change may affect the shares which Norway and Russia should 
have to get in order to reach  a cooperative agreement in their interests. 
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The main objective of this part is to investigate how the Barents Sea Treaty will impact on the 
cooperation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea in consequence of these said 
changes. 
According to the Barents Sea Treaty the coastal states shall abide by the established 
delimitation line and shall not exercise any sovereign rights or jurisdiction beyond it.
209
 It 
makes clear that such maritime boundary in the Barents Sea cannot be adjusted later. 
Therefore, fish stocks are subject to the sovereign rights of Norway and Russia singly in 
conformity with international law. 
As regards their fishing opportunities, Article 4 (1) of the Barents Sea Treaty states that they 
"shall not be adversely affected" by this Treaty. Undoubtedly, the northeasterly migration of 
fish stocks will negatively affect the opportunities of Norway to fish in the Barents Sea. The 
wording of the introductory paragraph does not provide sufficient information on how to 
avoid possible consequences. To this effect, the first paragraph of Article 4 should be read in 
conjunction with the second. 
It is specified that close cooperation between Norway and Russia can ensure their fishing 
opportunities. While the Annex I of the Barents Sea Treaty refers to the JFC, it is not clear 
what its parties have meant by the term "close cooperation in the sphere of fisheries". I 
suggest that the second paragraph implies the JFC. Furthermore, this cooperation should be 
undertaken with a view to maintain the existing shares of the total allowable catches volumes 
and to ensure relative stability of fishing activities for each of the relevant stocks.
210
 
The "relative stability" principle was developed by the EU Common Fisheries Policy and 
means that the allocation of fishing opportunities among states should be based upon a 
predictable share of the stocks for each state.
211
 This principle guarantees that the available 
living resources should be shared fairly between states, and that although there are 
fluctuations of the resources themselves, these shares of total allowable catch should be 
maintained. 
In spite of the inability to change the established boundary in the Barents Sea, the described 
commitments likely mean that the JFC practice to allocate the fish quotas will continue. 
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Moreover, the existing quotas will not be affected by changes in the abundance and 
accessibility of the fish stocks. However, the provisions of Article 4 are related to the fisheries 
opportunities of Norway and Russia. There is no mention about such opportunities of third 
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 It was considered in the part 4.2 of the thesis. 





The Barents Sea Treaty between the two coastal states, Norway and Russia, contains 
provisions on how to deal with the living marine resources in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean. Its implications for fisheries matters are significant. The main of them is the 
disappearance of the "grey zone" in the Barents Sea which has been absorbed partly by the 
Norwegian EEZ and partly by the Russian EEZ. Thus, it allows Norway and Russia to 
exercise coastal state jurisdiction over the waters and fish stocks within them. 
The main research question of whether the Barents Sea Treaty affects the cooperation and 
conservation obligations of Norway and Russia has been considered throughout the Master 
thesis. This Treaty has important implications for the obligations of the two coastal states. 
First of all the Treaty affects the obligation of the coastal states to cooperate which forms a 
basis for the fulfillment of other their obligations. 
It can be concluded that Norway and Russia through the JFC have successfully fulfilled the 
obligation to cooperate regarding shared and straddling fish stocks. However, the cooperation 
through the JFC is not aimed at highly migratory fish stocks of the Barents Sea. 
It has been considered that the JFC is neither a direct cooperation nor a RFMO in accordance 
with the provisions of the FSA. As regards the JFC as an arrangement under the FSA context, 
it is difficult to argue that this is so. While the conservation and management measures of the 
JFC are applied to the high seas, they are not directly binding for third states fishing for 
straddling fish stocks in the Loophole. 
Although it was hard to suggest which format of organizing cooperation the JFC has, Norway 
and Russia have found a solution to fulfill the stated in the LOSC and the FSA obligation to 
cooperate. The cooperation in the Barents Sea most likely is a form of a bilateral cooperation 
between two coastal states concerning management of shared fish stocks. Furthermore, 
Norway and Russia have fulfilled the cooperation obligation with other states in respect of 
straddling fish stocks. Relevant states cooperate directly through the (tri)bilateral agreements. 
Thus, it was reasonably to include in the Barents Sea Treaty the commitment of Norway and 
Russia to continue such cooperation. Norway and Russia through the JFC reached good 
results in the management of the target fish stocks. 




Management of fish stocks in the Barents Sea was amended through the requirements to apply 
the precautionary approach and to ensure relative stability. The Barents Sea Treaty expands 
the application of the precautionary approach to shared fish stocks, while this approach is 
otherwise only codified in the FSA; applicable to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. 
The guarantee of relative stability is an important element to ensure permanence of the 
bilateral regime in consequence of climate change in the Barents Sea. Moreover, the Barents 
Sea Treaty is reflected the access of other states to fish stocks in the Barents Sea. 
The next is the implication of the Barents Sea Treaty for the status of the maritime zones 
around Svalbard. It was reflected in the thesis that the Barents Sea Treaty can be interpreted 
as Russian recognition that the establishment of full range of maritime zones around Svalbard 
is not prevented by the Spitsbergen Treaty. However, Russia is not openly willing to accept 
this fact. Even if it is natural to interpret the ratification of the Barents Sea Treaty by Russia as 
an acknowledgement of the right of Norway to claim these zones, this does not solve the 
question of whether the Spitsbergen Treaty applies beyond the territorial sea. Hence, the 
future discussions will be focused on the application of the Spitsbergen Treaty to these 
existing zones. 
While it can be unambiguously concluded that the Barents Sea Treaty affects the obligations 
of Norway and Russia, there are no reasons to expect fundamental changes in the cooperation 
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 Recognising our mutual determination to strengthen our good neighbourly relations, 
secure stability and enhance cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, we are 
pleased to announce that our negotiating delegations have reached preliminary agreement on 
the bilateral maritime delimitation between our two countries in these areas, which has been 
the object of extensive negotiations over the years. 
 As stated in the Ilulissat Declaration of the coastal States around the Arctic Ocean of 
28 May 2008, both Norway and the Russian Federation are committed to the extensive legal 
framework applicable to the Arctic Ocean, as well as to the orderly settlement of any possible 
overlapping claims. 
 The negotiations have covered all the relevant issues concerning the maritime 
delimitation. The two delegations recommend, in addition to a maritime delimitation line, the 
adoption of treaty provisions that would maintain and enhance cooperation with regard to 
fisheries and management of hydrocarbon resources. A comprehensive Treaty concerning 
maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean is thus 
envisaged. Such a Treaty shall not prejudice rights and obligations under other international 
treaties to which both the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation are parties. 
 The two delegations recommend a delimitation line on the basis of international law in 
order to achieve an equitable solution. In addition to the relevant factors identified in this 
regard in international law, including the effect of major disparities in respective coastal 
lengths, they have taken into account the progress achieved in the course of long-standing 
negotiations between the parties in order to reach agreement. They recommend a line that 
divides the overall disputed area in two parts of approximately the same size. 
 Bearing in mind the developments in the Arctic Ocean and the role of our two States 
in this region, they highlight the bilateral cooperation with regard to the determination of the 
outer limits of the continental shelf, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. 
 In the field of fisheries, the two delegations underline the special economic importance 
of the living resources of the Barents Sea to Norway and the Russian Federation and to their 
coastal communities. The need to avoid any economic dislocation of coastal regions whose 
inhabitants have habitually fished in the area is stressed. Moreover, the traditional Norwegian 
and Russian fisheries in the Barents Sea are highlighted. They recall the primary interest and 
responsibility of Norway and the Russian Federation, as coastal States, for the conservation 
and rational management of the living resources of the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, in 
accordance with international law. The conclusion of a Treaty on maritime delimitation and 
cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean shall therefore not adversely affect the 
fishing opportunities of either State. To this end, provisions to the effect of continued close 
cooperation of the two States in the sphere of fisheries and preservation of relative stability of 
their fishing activities are recommended. The same applies to provisions concerning 
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continued cooperation in the Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission, as well as 
necessary transitional arrangements. 
 In the field of hydrocarbon cooperation, the two delegations recommend the adoption 
of detailed rules and procedures ensuring efficient and responsible management of their 
hydrocarbon resources in cases where any single oil or gas deposit should extend across the 
delimitation line. 
 Recalling our common desire to complete the maritime delimitation, we express our 
firm intention to take, in accordance with the requirements of the legislation of each State, all 
necessary measures to conclude a Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the 
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean at the earliest possible date. 
Oslo, 27 April 2010 
Jonas Gahr Støre 
Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Norway 
 
Sergey Lavrov 
























Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean
216
 
The Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation (hereinafter “The Parties”),  
Desiring to maintain and strengthen the good neighbourly relations,  
Bearing in mind the developments in the Arctic Ocean and the role of the Parties in this 
region,  
Desiring to contribute to securing stability and strengthen the cooperation in the Barents Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean,  
Referring to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 (hereinafter “the Convention”),  
Referring to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation on 
the Maritime Delimitation in the Varangerfjord area of 11 July 2007 (hereinafter “the 2007 
Agreement”) and desiring to complete the maritime delimitation between the Parties,  
Aware of the special economic significance of the living resources of the Barents Sea to 
Norway and the Russian Federation and to their coastal fishing communities and of the need 
to avoid economic dislocation in coastal regions whose inhabitants have habitually fished in 
the area,  
Aware of the traditional Norwegian and Russian fisheries in the Barents Sea,  
Recalling their primary interest and responsibility as coastal States for the conservation and 
rational management of the living resources of the Barents Sea and in the Arctic Ocean, in 
accordance with international law,  
Underlining the importance of efficient and responsible management of their hydrocarbon 
resources,  
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1 
1. The maritime delimitation line between the Parties in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
shall be defined as geodetic lines connecting points defined by the following coordinates:  
1. 70° 16’ 28.95” N 32° 04’ 23.00” E 
(This point corresponds to point 6 of the delimitation line as defined in the 2007 Agreement.) 
2. 73° 41’ 10.85” N 37° 00’ 00.00” E 
3. 75° 11’ 41.00” N 37° 00’ 00.00” E 
4. 75° 48’ 00.74” N 38° 00’ 00.00” E 
5. 78° 37’ 29.50” N 38° 00’ 00.00” E 
6. 79° 17’ 04.77” N 34° 59’ 56.00” E 
7. 83° 21’ 07.00” N 35° 00’ 00.29” E 
8. 84° 41’ 40.67” N 32° 03’ 51.36” E 
The terminal point of the delimitation line is defined as the point of intersection of a geodetic 
line drawn through the points 7 and 8 and the geodetic line connecting the easternmost point 
of the outer limit of the continental shelf of Norway and the westernmost point of the outer 
limit of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation, as established in accordance with 
Article 76 and Annex II of the Convention. 
2. The geographical coordinates of the points listed in paragraph 1 of this Article are defined 
in World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84(G1150, at epoch 2001.0)).  
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3. By way of illustration, the delimitation line and the points listed in paragraph 1 of this 
Article have been drawn on the schematic chart annexed to the present Treaty. In case of 
difference between the description of the line as provided for in this Article and the drawing 
of the line on the schematic chart, the description of the line in this Article shall prevail. 
 
Article 2  
Each Party shall abide by the maritime delimitation line as defined in Article 1 and shall not 
claim or exercise any sovereign rights or coastal State jurisdiction in maritime areas beyond 
this line.  
 
Article 3  
1. In the area east of the maritime delimitation line that lies within 200 nautical miles of the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of mainland Norway is measured but 
beyond 200 nautical miles of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the 
Russian Federation is measured (hereinafter “the Special Area”), the Russian Federation shall, 
from the day of the entry into force of the present Treaty, be entitled to exercise such 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from exclusive economic zone jurisdiction that 
Norway would otherwise be entitled to exercise under international law.  
2. To the extent that the Russian Federation exercises the sovereign rights or jurisdiction in 
the Special Area as provided for in this Article, such exercise of sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction derives from the agreement of the Parties and does not constitute an extension of 
its exclusive economic zone. To this end, the Russian Federation shall take the necessary 
steps to ensure that any exercise on its part of such sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the 
Special Area shall be so characterized in its relevant laws, regulations and charts.  
Article 4  
1. The fishing opportunities of either Party shall not be adversely affected by the conclusion 
of the present Treaty.  
2. To this end, the Parties shall pursue close cooperation in the sphere of fisheries, with a view 
to maintain their existing respective shares of total allowable catch volumes and to ensure 
relative stability of their fishing activities for each of the stocks concerned.  
3. The Parties shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management 
and exploitation of shared fish stocks, including straddling fish stocks, in order to protect the 
living marine resources and preserve the marine environment.  
4. Except as provided for in this Article and in Annex I, nothing in this Treaty shall affect the 
application of agreements on fisheries cooperation between the Parties.  
 
Article 5  
1. If a hydrocarbon deposit extends across the delimitation line, the Parties shall apply the 
provisions in Annex II.  
2. If the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit on the continental shelf of one of the Parties is 
established and the other Party is of the opinion that the said deposit extends to its continental 
shelf, the latter Party may notify the former Party and shall submit the data on which it bases 
its opinion.  
If such an opinion is submitted, the Parties shall initiate discussions on the extent of the 
hydrocarbon deposit and the possibility for exploitation of the deposit as a unit. In the course 
of these discussions, the Party initiating them shall support its opinion with evidence from 
geophysical data and/or geological data, including any existing drilling data and both Parties 
shall make their best efforts to ensure that all relevant information is made available for the 
purposes of these discussions. If the hydrocarbon deposit extends to the continental shelf of 
each of the Parties and the deposit on the continental shelf of one Party can be exploited 




wholly or in part from the continental shelf of the other Party, or the exploitation of the 
hydrocarbon deposit on the continental shelf of one Party would affect the possibility of 
exploitation of the hydrocarbon deposit on the continental shelf of the other Party, agreement 
on the exploitation of the hydrocarbon deposit as a unit, including its apportionment between 
the Parties, shall be reached at the request of one of the Parties (hereinafter “the Unitisation 
Agreement”) in accordance with Annex II.  
3. Exploitation of any hydrocarbon deposit which extends to the continental shelf of the other 
Party may only begin as provided for in the Unitisation Agreement.  
4. Any disagreement between the Parties concerning such deposits shall be resolved in 
accordance with Articles 2-4 of Annex II. 
Article 6  
The present Treaty shall not prejudice rights and obligations under other international treaties 
to which both the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation are Parties, and which are 
in force at the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty. 
 
Article 7  
1. The Annexes to the present Treaty form an integral part of it. Unless expressly provided 
otherwise, a reference to this Treaty includes a reference to the Annexes.  
2. Any amendments to the Annexes shall enter into force in the order and on the date provided 
for in the agreements introducing these amendments. 
 
Article 8  
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the 30th day after the 
exchange of instruments of ratification. 
 
DONE in duplicate in Murmansk on 15 September 2010, each in Norwegian and Russian 
languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
For the Kingdom of Norway  
For the Russian Federation 
 
Annex I to the Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation  in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean Fisheries matters  
 
Article 1  
The Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on co-operation in the fishing industry of 11 April 1975 and 
the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning mutual relations in the field of fisheries of 15 
October 1976 shall continue to stay in force for fifteen years after the entry into force of the 
present Treaty. After the expiry of this term each of these Agreements shall remain in force for 
successive six year terms, unless at least six months before the expiry of the six year term one 
Party notifies the other Party about its termination. 
 
Article 2  
In the previously disputed area within 200 nautical miles from the Norwegian or Russian 
mainland technical regulations concerning, in particular, mesh and minimum size of catches set 
by each of the Parties for their fishing vessels shall apply for a transitional period of two years 
from the day of entry into force of the present Treaty. 
 




Article 3  
Total allowable catches, mutual quotas of catches and other regulatory measures for fishing shall 
continue to be negotiated within the Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission in 
accordance with the Agreements referred to in Article 1 of the present Annex. 
 
Article 4  
The Norwegian-Russian Joint Fisheries Commission shall continue to consider improved 
monitoring and control measures with respect to jointly managed fish stocks in accordance with 
the Agreements referred to in Article 1 of the present Annex. 
 
Annex II to the Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean 
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits 
 
Article 1  
The Unitisation Agreement between the Parties concerning exploitation of a transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit, referred to in Article 5 of the present Treaty, shall provide for the following: 
  
1. Definition of the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit to be exploited as a unit (geographical 
coordinates normally shown in an annex to the Agreement).  
 
2. The geographical, geophysical and geological characteristics of the transboundary hydrocarbon 
deposit and the methodology used for data classification. Any geological data used as a basis for 
such geological characterisation shall be the joint property of the legal persons holding rights 
under the Joint Operating Agreement, referred to in paragraph 6 a) of the present Article.  
 
3. A statement of the total amount of the hydrocarbon reserves in place in the transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit and the methodology used for such calculation, as well as the apportionment 
of the hydrocarbon reserves between the Parties.  
 
4. The right of each Party to copies of all geological data, as well as all other data of relevance for 
the unitised deposit, which are gathered in connection with the exploitation of the deposit.  
 
5. The obligation of the Parties to grant individually all necessary authorisations required by their 
respective national laws for the development and operation of the transboundary hydrocarbon 
deposit as a unit in accordance with the Unitisation Agreement.  
 
6. The obligation of each Party  
 
a) to require the relevant legal persons holding rights to explore for and exploit hydrocarbons on 
each respective side of the delimitation line to enter into a Joint Operating Agreement to regulate 
the exploitation of the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit as a unit in accordance with the 
Unitisation Agreement;  
b) to require the submission of a Joint Operating Agreement for approval by both Parties, as well 
as to issue such approval with no undue delay and not to unduly withhold it; 
c) to ensure that the provisions contained in the Unitisation Agreement prevail over the provisions 
of the Joint Operating Agreement in case of any discrepancy between them;  
d) to require the legal persons holding the rights to exploit a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit 
as a unit to appoint a unit operator as their joint agent in accordance with the provisions set out in 
the Unitisation Agreement, such an appointment of, and any change of, the unit operator being 




subject to prior approval by the two Parties.  
 
7. The obligation of each Party not to withhold, subject to its national laws, a permit for the 
drilling of wells by, or on account of, the legal persons holding rights to explore for and produce 
hydrocarbons on its respective side of the delimitation line for purposes related to the 
determination and apportionment of the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit.  
 
8. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the obligation of each Party not to permit the 
commencement of production from a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit unless the Parties have 
jointly approved such commencement in accordance with the Unitisation Agreement.  
 
9. The obligation of the Parties to determine by mutual agreement in due time before the 
production of hydrocarbons from the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit is about to cease, the 
timing of cessation of the production from the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit.  
 
10. The obligation of the Parties to consult each other with respect to applicable health, safety and 
environmental measures that are required by the national laws and regulations of each Party.  
 
11. The obligation of each Party to ensure inspection of hydrocarbon installations located on its 
continental shelf and hydrocarbon activities carried out thereon in relation to the exploitation of a 
transboundary deposit, the obligation of each Party to ensure inspectors of the other Party access 
on request to such installations, and to relevant metering systems on the continental shelf or in the 
territory of either Party, as well as the obligation of each Party to ensure that relevant information 
is given to the other Party on a regular basis to enable it to safeguard its fundamental interests, 
including inter alia those related to health, safety, environment, hydrocarbon production and 
metering.  
 
12. The obligation of each Party not to alter the right to explore for and produce hydrocarbons 
awarded by one Party, which applies to a field that is subject to unitisation in accordance with the 
Unitisation Agreement, nor to assign it to other legal persons, without prior consultation with the 
other Party.  
 
13. The obligation of the Parties to establish a Joint Commission for consultations between the 
Parties on issues pertaining to any planned or existing unitised hydrocarbon deposits, providing a 
means for ensuring continuous consultation and exchange of information between the two Parties 
on such issues and a means for resolving issues through consultations.  
 
Article 2  
The Parties shall make every effort to resolve any disagreement as rapidly as possible. If, 
however, the Parties fail to agree, they shall jointly consider all options for resolving the 
impasse. 
 
Article 3  
1. If the Parties fail to reach the Unitisation Agreement referred to in Article 1 of the present 
Annex, the disagreement should as rapidly as possible be resolved by negotiations or by any 
other procedure agreed between the Parties. If the disagreement is not settled within six 
months following the date on which a Party first requested such negotiations with the other 
Party, either Party shall be entitled to submit the dispute to an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal 
consisting of three members.  




2. Each Party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so appointed shall elect a 
third arbitrator, who shall be the Chairperson. The Chairperson shall not be a national of or 
habitually reside in Norway or the Russian Federation. If either Party fails to appoint an 
arbitrator within three months of a request to do so, either Party may request that the President 
of the International Court of Justice make the appointment. The same procedure shall apply if, 
within one month of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been 
elected.  
3. All decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal shall, in the absence of unanimity, be taken by a 
majority vote of its members. The Arbitral Tribunal shall in all other matters determine its 
own rules of procedure. The decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be binding upon the 
Parties and the Unitisation Agreement referred to in Article 1 of the present Annex shall be 
concluded by them in accordance with these decisions. 
 
Article 4  
1. In the event that a failure to reach agreement concerns the apportionment of the 
hydrocarbon deposit between the Parties, they shall appoint an independent expert to decide 
upon such apportionment. The decision of the independent expert shall be binding upon the 
Parties.  
2. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties may 
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 The map is made by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and taken from the article by Øystein Jensen, "Current 
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